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__________ 
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 __________ 
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                                   Appellant 
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_________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
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(D.C. No. 2-09-00194) 
District Judge:  Hon. Mitchell S. Goldberg  
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
This is an appeal from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Radio One, Inc. on Cheryl Anderson’s claims that Radio One terminated her employment 
in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621  
et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.  We 
will affirm.1
With respect to the ADEA claim, Radio One did not dispute that Anderson 
established a prima facie case of age discrimination for purposes of the summary 
judgment motion and the District Court presumed that she had met this burden.  See 
Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc) (setting 
forth elements of a prima facie claim).  The burden thus shifted to Radio One to produce 
evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.  Id.  Once 
Radio One produced such evidence, the burden shifted back to Anderson to provide 
sufficient evidence to allow a factfinder to either reject the employer’s nondiscriminatory 
explanation, or conclude that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not 
 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we need not discuss the facts or 
procedural history of this case.   
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment, and apply the same standard applicable in the 
District Court found in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.  See Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 
527 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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a motivating cause of her discharge (pretext).  Id. (citing Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 
763 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
Radio One claims that it terminated Anderson because she failed to satisfy the 
demands of the Program Assistant position, including meeting deadlines and accurately 
completing assignments.  We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Anderson 
did not then produce sufficient evidence of a pretext for age discrimination.2
We have considered all of Anderson’s arguments, but we find no basis for 
reversal.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in favor of 
Radio One.
  Indeed, 
Anderson has never meaningfully disputed the substance of Radio One’s repeated 
concerns with her job performance.  Because Anderson failed to meet her burden to show 
pretext, summary judgment is appropriate on her ADEA claim. 
Summary judgment is likewise appropriate on Anderson’s ADA claim.  We agree 
with the District Court that Anderson “is not actually disabled” within the meaning of 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(2), and “she was not ‘regarded as’ disabled” within the meaning of 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(3) by her employer.  Anderson v. Radio One, Inc., No. 09-194, 2010 WL 
3719088, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2010).  Even if Anderson could establish that Radio 
One regarded her as disabled, as the District Court concluded, she did not meet her 
burden to demonstrate pretext for disability discrimination.   
                                              
2 Notably, prior to termination, Radio One offered Anderson a position as a 
receptionist, but she rejected the offer.   
